The enduring relevance of realism for grand strategy in Europe

How realism can inspire grand strategy in Europe - if it is seen as more than a construct from the academic ivory tower

International relations (IR) theory and foreign policy, or even grand strategy, may seem like two different universes. Theory, as it is mostly and often exclusively used in the academic context, is sometimes described as an intellectual endeavour which tends to never leave the “ivory tower”; grand strategy, in contrast, is (or should be) designed to address real-world problems, and especially to prepare for long-term challenges.

Nevertheless, there is a good case to be made for bringing IR theory into processes of the elaboration of a grand strategy for Europe, or at least individual European states, in the changing European security environment and a changing global order. As questions related to deterrence, threats from other states, the distribution of power on the international level and its impact on the global order itself resurface, realism is a natural fit for this. Realism and its key paradigms can provide structure and guidance for reflection processes, support anticipation, and help craft both short-term responses to the most pressing challenges and longer-term strategy.

Hard times for realism after the Cold War

This disconnect is particularly visible when it comes to realist IR theory and Europe: after the end of the Cold War and with the “end of history”, as Francis Fukuyama described the end of confrontation between blocs, realism was almost considered obsolete. Key assumptions of realism seemed outdated and barely applicable to reality: How could one reflect in terms of balancing power or threat from a hostile state when the adversary, the Soviet Union, had just collapsed? And how could the security dilemma, describing a situation where states enhance their capabilities because they feel threatened by others, still seem valid in a world where European states had no threat from Russia to face that might have logically led to such behaviour? Even more, European states were doubling down on European integration, building institutions based on the idea of economic interdependence and shared values and ideas.

While liberal and constructivist IR theorists rejoiced, realists had to find new ways to remain relevant to the debate. Some argue that they did not, simply because real-world phenomena could barely be explained by the ideas of power or security-seeking. Others adapted realist theories to explain the new reality of the European security environment: a classic example here is the literature on soft balancing, which outlines how Europeans, instead of drawing on material resources (meaning: military capabilities and economic potential, usually described as the sources of hard power) could undermine the United States’ foreign policy goals through soft balancing. In parallel, neoclassical realism evolved as a new variant of realism, which also brings in domestic factors, such as regime type or strategic culture, as intervening variables.

Academic foreign policy analysis vs. folk realism in policy speech

Although scholars have increasingly employed realist approaches in research on European security and the strategies of European states, their work is mostly the analysis of national foreign policy or grand strategy— and much less so on actually crafting responses. Certainly, there are formats bringing academics and policymakers together in workshops and for joint reflections, and both sides clearly benefit from this: academics get a “reality check” of their work on theory, and policymakers receive a “big picture” perspective on their work which often focuses on very short-term foreign policy challenges, if not crisis management. Nevertheless, it is rare to see academics actually become foreign policy advisers in the European context.

Simultaneously, some politicians have turned into what can be described as folk realism, namely the use of realist terminology to describe current phenomena in the international system, yet rather in a simplistic way and without a thorough application of theory. Examples in the European context are easy to find: think about former EU High Representative Borrell, who called for the EU learning “the language of power” in 2016, or French President Macron, who voiced the ambition for France to become a “power of the balancing” or a “balancing power” (puissance d’équilibre) in the Indo-Pacific in the context of US-China competition. While the use of these terms has certainly guaranteed high media attention for these statements, their use lacked an actual theoretical underpinning, and the concepts have never been fleshed out.

Applying realist theory for grand strategy

The use of terms and concepts derived from theory without actually applying it rigorously as a starting point for grand strategy is, in fact, a missed opportunity. Certainly, the application of a theory always has limits: one of the key characteristics of theory is simplification, and real-world phenomena are often so utterly complex that a single theory could never grasp all their aspects. Nevertheless, this simplification is precisely why theory can be so helpful for elaborating a grand strategy: using theory is like putting on a set of glasses or adopting a certain set of beliefs through which one sees the world and the international challenges which need to be addressed. As realism emphasises the importance of the international level, it allows those adopting it as a theoretical lens to zoom out and to see these phenomena from a 10,000 foot level — which is precisely what is needed if grand strategy is understood as the definition of a state’s (or European) long-term objectives through linking ends, means, and ways.

Especially in a world where power politics increasingly characterises the international system, where alliances and interstate cooperation are shifting, and where capabilities and the threat environment in Europe are considerably changing, realism offers a good theoretical lens to capture these current dynamics. Although some strands of realism bring in factors from the domestic level, such as the role of leaders or regime type, the system-level perspective mutes short-term domestic debates for the moment. This systematic view on the “big picture” appears particularly relevant as the elaboration of grand strategy is a long-term endeavour, where applying a realist lens can mitigate the risk of following a short-term logic.

In practice, it seems impossible to follow a “purist” realist logic when crafting a grand strategy. Domestic politics — think: party ideology, positioning for electoral campaigns, or public opinion — will often drive political choices, especially when electoral gains are at stake. But this does not mean that a realist approach is destined to failure from the beginning: starting the definition of ends, means, and ways from a “big picture” perspective is a valuable starting point; alternatively, a realist analysis can correct mistakes and hence prevent repeating them in the future.

Towards realist grand strategy in Europe

With Russia’s war against Ukraine, the risk of abandonment by the United States, US-China competition, and increasingly active middle powers shaping global order in different realms, European states face today an unprecedented strategic challenge — especially because they can no longer rely on US leadership to address these. Besides finding short-term foreign policy responses, European states must now much more actively engage in the process of grand strategy: they must define their long-term interests in terms of objectives (ends) and how they intend to achieve them (through means and ways).

Realist theory can guide this endeavour because European states have for a long time not conceptualised their understanding of international relations from a perspective of power; now that security and shifts in the distribution of power globally become major concerns again, it is the right lens to adopt. In fact, European states must not only learn the language of power, they need to learn thinking in these terms and fleshing them out in policy. But this also requires an understanding that realism is not just a theory from an academic ivory tower but a powerful tool for grand strategy — if those in charge of it are willing to follow its logic.

In times of their relative decline vis-à-vis other global power centres, for example in terms of share of global GDP or demographics, and given the extremely high level of integration among European states through the EU, an ideal type of grand strategy should be genuinely European. But even if there was political will to reflect from a realist perspectives on the ends of an EU grand strategy — not least because the Commission regularly stresses the aspirations of the EU as a geopolitical actor —, foreign and security policy remains a competence of member states; the EU itself lacks means and ways for implementation.

Realist grand strategy in Europe can therefore only be driven by individual European states and must consistently include a European dimension. Most importantly, this process needs to start. It will require political and intellectual shifts, but in times of massive shifts in the international system and Europe’s very own security order, Europeans are probably better off as realists.