What to watch: European security, defence & foreign policy in 2025

6 January 2025

2025 could become a moment of truth for European security and defence policy with regard to strategic paradigms, capabilities, and key decisions to be made. Developments within and outside Europe will directly impact European security and defence and shape the EU’s, and more generally Europe’s, role as an actor in the global order.

Ukraine’s future: The outcome of the war in Ukraine will significantly shape the European security order, and with the election of Donald Trump, the scenario of a deal and negotiations is increasingly discussed. For Europeans, the key issue in this context is remaining relevant because a deal between Putin and Trump on the European security order, without the representation of Ukrainian and European voices and interests, would probably be a worst-case scenario. Two conditions appear critical in this context: a genuinely European vision for the European security order, which Europeans could eventually present to DC, and European unity regarding potential scenarios.

Defending Europe without the US: While some argue that Europe has to brace for a scenario of “defending Europe with less America”, Europeans must also actively brace for a scenario where they have to defend Europe without the US, as the re-election of Donald Trump puts a big question mark to the reliability of the United States in European security. Europeans will have to ask themselves the uncomfortable questions: What are the implications of the EU’s mutual solidarity clause, article 42.7 TEU, in case the US block a joint position of NATO regarding article 5? What is the role of the European nuclear powers, France and the UK, for nuclear defence and deterrence in Europe? How can Europeans do more, and faster?

Europe between abandonment and entrapment: The re-election of Donald Trump will reinforce general risk for states joining alliances, namely the parallel risks of abandonment and entrapment. On the one hand, Europeans will be willing to make considerable commitments to Washington in order to keep the US engaged in European security, at least as a backstop; on the other hand, this commitment could also be conditioned by Washington on European alignment in other policy areas, particularly the approach to the Indo-Pacific or China policy. Europeans will have to clearly define their interests and define the trade-offs they are potentially willing to make — and which would not be acceptable.

European defence “made in Brussels”: With Commission President von der Leyen, EU foreign affairs chief Kallas, and Commissioner for Defence Kubilius, a new trio is likely to drive EU security and defence in Brussels. Among others, the publication of an EU White Paper on defence is planned within the first 100 days of the new Commission and could outline the EU’s instruments for defence. Another key aspect to watch is financing, as the key question is whether the EU will be able to provide the estimated to additional 500 billion euros over the next decade in the Draghi report. Eurobonds for defence, meaning common debt at the financial markets, could be an option, but several member states are still blocking this endeavour.

Syria’s future and a new geopolitical order in the Middle East: The fall of the Assad regime in Syria will completely reshuffle the geopolitical dynamics in the region. Europe could, in fact, make an ambitious offer to the transitional government through linking attractive financial support to a political reform, whilst also outlining the benefits of the European offer for the long-term. The joint meeting of the German and French foreign ministers with the transition government gives hope that Europe takes this challenge seriously, but it remains to be seen to what extent Europeans will also be serious about a potential financial commitment.

The persisting challenge of Libya: In light of the fall of the Assad regime and the geopolitical reshuffling of the Middle East, the conflict in Libya has almost merged into a forgotten one right in Europe’s neighbourhood — though it should not be. Most recently, Russia has started to relocate its troops and military hardware to Libya, which implies that the Southern Mediterranean might increasingly become a critical area for European security and defence in terms of influence and force posture.

EU-India and Europe-India relations: India has a critical geostrategic position in the Indo-Pacific and also plays a key role as a strategic partner for individual European states, especially France, as well as the EU. The relations with New Delhi are a central part of the EU’s approach to the Indo-Pacific, and India becomes an increasingly interesting economic partner in times of a looming trade war with the US and the willingness to diversify supply chains from China. While there is certainly potential to deepen the relations with India both on the bilateral and the EU level, New Delhi has also not always been an easy partner for Europe — but getting the relationship right will matter in the future.

Finally China policy “made in Europe”? Until today, the EU does not have a comprehensive China strategy. Although the approach of China as a partner, competitor and rival, as outlined in the Strategic Outlook in 2019, remains the guideline of Europe’s approach to China, the view is slowly changing in European capitals. The approach of “de-risking” proposed by the Commission, as well as the willingness of European allies to describe China as an “enabler” of Russia’s war against Ukraine in the last NATO Communiqué, illustrate the change in tone and attitude in Europe. At the same time, economic ties with China remain crucially important for Europe, especially for the German industry. While it was already challenging for Europeans to agree on a joint approach towards Beijing, the election of Donald Trump as US President will certainly not help. Individual European states might use China policy as a bargaining chip in their engagement with Washington, and notably be willing to align with Washington’s approach if the US commitment to the security guarantees for Europe depends on it.

Europe’s approach to Africa in a changing security environment: Europe’s engagement with Africa has substantively changed over the last decade — not at least because its military involvement has been significantly reduced. At the same time, development cooperation and economic cooperation, as well as capacity building, remain key components of the EU’s approach towards the continent. At a time where external powers increasingly discover or enhance their interest in engagement with Africa — think of China, Russia, Türkiye, or Israel —, the EU will also have to rethink its approach and take these factors into consideration. In other words, it needs a true geopolitical and strategic reading of African politics and its approach to the region, which could then also lead to a more strategic use of instruments like the Global Gateway or economic cooperation more generally.

Economic security as part of EU foreign policy: Following the publication of the Economic Security Strategy in 2024, the EU might include the economic security dimension more consistently in its foreign policy in 2025. Such approaches can include supply chain diversification, but a more systematic inclusion of elements related to economic security, such as the joint production of critical components, could also be a helpful instrument for engaging with potential partners outside the transatlantic alliance, including beyond economic topics. Especially at a time where the EU is facing the threat of tariffs from the US, a more active economic foreign policy will be critical for Europeans.