Road to Ankara: building NATO 3.0 amidst geopolitical shifts

This year's NATO summit is not just about capability but broader questions of the alliance's future - and three main challenges related to shifts in global politics.

Ahead of the 2025 NATO summit in The Hague, the demands from the United States towards Europe were clear: the summit was all about ramping up defence spending to enhance Europe’s conventional capabilities. The goal (and, after the summit, political success) of the Trump administration was pushing European allies to commit to spending 3.5% of their GDP on defence and an additional 1.5% on defence-adjacent projects. Although the summit also displayed a clear lack of political vision and an even clearer lack of a willingness to develop such a vision, the United States and Europe could both frame the summit as a transatlantic success story at a time of tensions.

The picture looks significantly different ahead of the 2026 NATO summit, which will be held in Ankara on 7-8 July. European leaders regularly highlight the commitments and concrete achievements of the last year — such as the deployment of the German brigade to Lithuania, the revision of France’s nuclear doctrine, new EU instruments or funding mechanisms, or increases in national defence spending — as a contribution to the European pillar of NATO. While US officials, on the other side, call for a “NATO 3.0” and alliance reform with a transfer of most of the conventional burden to Europe, the most noteworthy signal coming out of Washington ahead of the summit is the silence. On the European side, there is little doubt that the US demands about increased defence spending, defence production, and responsibility for the conventional domain will remain unchanged, but the central political questions of alliance reform remain unanswered.

Thinking NATO beyond capabilities

The key challenge for building NATO 3.0 is not merely one of capability or transatlantic (dis)unity, it is the strategic environment and geopolitical shifts, as well as diverging visions. Key questions of burden-shifting in terms of capability and doctrine will certainly remain, including whether the position of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces should, on the medium- to long-term, be transferred to European states. Furthermore, the question of the scope and speed of US withdrawal from the alliance is of paramount importance for European states to be answered, as any attempt to build a “European way of defence” needs to be embedded in these structures.

However, the debate on capabilities — often almost morphing into an obsession with defence spending percentages rather than critical questions like doctrine or interoperability among European states — has also structurally muted the debate about the alliance’s future. Although the capability question and burden-shifting are clearly important and need to be addressed on the short-term, it would be dangerous for Europe and the US to lose sight of the bigger political questions, particularly the impact of geopolitical shifts on the alliance’s priorities and strategy. If unaddressed, these challenges could become a considerable threat for alliance cohesion and jeopardise both Europe’s and the US’ ability to react to global challenges.

Challenge 1: theatre linkage

Linking Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security was a key priority for NATO under the Biden administration, which also actively pressured European states to engage more actively in the Indo-Pacific and regularly pushed for the inclusion of China policy in NATO and other transatlantic formats, such as the EU-US Trade and Technology Council. Consequently, European states have invested considerable political effort into building these relationships, thinking more actively about linkages between the European and Indo-Pacific theatres, and signalling in the region, including through deployments. It would be inaccurate to reduce all these efforts to the Biden administration: especially France, which also holds overseas territory in the Indo-Pacific, had prioritised the region through different strategies since 2018, and it has also pushed other European states to do more. Yet, the US approach of theatre linkage has clearly pushed European states to double down on their efforts: especially following the considerable support of the US for Ukraine following the start of the full-scale invasion, European states realised that interest and engagement in the Indo-Pacific, Washington’s key priority, would ultimately also benefit US commitment to Europe.

Under the Trump administration, this approach seems much less likely to succeed. Although the latest US National Security Strategy, published in November 2025, emphasises the importance of the Western Hemisphere, there is little doubt that the competition between the United States and China remains the most important structural determinant of US foreign and security policy today. As the strategy of Washington towards competition with China and, more generally, the Indo-Pacific remains unclear, this uncertainty comes with a considerable challenge for NATO. From a European perspective, it is challenging to gauge US expectations towards Europe, both today and in case of a potential military incident in the region. After years of calls for more engagement, it currently seems that the US approach is shifting towards Europe managing European security (mostly alone) and the US focusing on the Indo-Pacific.

It remains, however, unclear to what extent the US still sees a role for NATO in the Indo-Pacific, if it sees a role at all, or if NATO should exclusively limit its role and strategic focus to the Euro-Atlantic theatre. These clarifications are critical for expectation management of both sides within the alliance. For Europe, visibility on the US vision for NATO and the Indo-Pacific, and more generally linking the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres, would be an important input for individual and collective preparation, including in the EU. For the US, it is critical to communicate expectations more clearly towards Europeans, as the focus on capabilities of the last NATO summit set Europe’s priorities for the relationship. If the US does not want to cause open disagreement and European paralysis over different interpretations of US demands, clear communication towards European capitals is key. The US National Defence Strategy published earlier this year already sketches out a division of labour where Europe contains Russia and the US “prioritises defending US homeland and deterring China”, but the US and Europe would both benefit from clearer timelines and expectation formulation. This is even more important in conversations beyond NATO and on EU-NATO cooperation as the EU has played a critical role in forging political partnerships as well as Security and Defence Partnerships with Indo-Pacific countries. A key challenge on the medium-term will thus consist in shifting the US strategic focus to the region without preventing the EU and individual European countries from engaging with Indo-Pacific partners on their own terms.

Challenge 2: Iran and the Middle East

The second strategic question for NATO is the question of NATO’s role in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Albeit not prioritised in the National Security Strategy nor in initial strategic thinking of the Trump administration, the US administration’s new approach to the region now binds considerable political and military resources. The re-prioritisation of the Middle East and significant defence industrial needs directly affect Europe, for example through the delayed delivery of US systems to Northern European partners. Economically, European economies are grappling with high energy prices resulting from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and global energy market dynamics. On the medium to long-term, it is likely for Europe to be much more exposed by the ramifications of the US strikes on Iran, including challenges for maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz or migration movements. Europe will have only a limited margin of manoeuvre to shape these dynamics, both in Iran or on Israel’s policy in the region, but as developments unfold in Europe’s direct neighbourhood, Europe will have to respond and cannot simply ignore them. Dependent on the situation, managing security challenges at the Southern flank — which especially Southern European countries have consistently recalled not to forget over the absolute prioritisation of supporting Ukraine and the Eastern flank — could hence very quickly also become a European responsibility again, especially when the US decides to focus on Asia.

At the same time, the US strikes on Iran have also demonstrated how important it is for the US to be able to operate out of its European bases. Especially as Washington reconsiders its force posture in Europe and withdrawal from Europe, clarity on US withdrawal plans from Europe and information on to what extent US forces will remain physically in Europe to de facto operate outside the European theatre will be important signalling to US allies in Europe.

NATO allies should therefore not mute the debate on the Southern flank over a focus on capabilities at the NATO summit. As host of the summit and thanks to its pivotal geographic position, Türkiye is well positioned to place the topic on the agenda. At the same time, it is, however, also questionable to what extent Ankara can set the agenda and shape negotiations on the region, given that Türkiye still grapples with “post-American hesitation” and has its very own interests as a regional power.

Beyond the question of burden-sharing and burden-shifting on the Southern flank, NATO allies need to take decisions on the institutional approach towards the South. The appointment of a Special Representative for the Southern Neighbourhood in 2024 and the opening of a NATO liaison office in Jordan in 2025 were critical steps for the symbolic presence of the alliance in the region, and also an important signal towards Southern European member states that their security priorities were taken seriously at a time where the alliance was mostly focused on deterring Russia. In the short to medium term, NATO allies will have to answer the question of burden-sharing and burden-shifting in the region and how engagement between NATO and regional powers can look like in the future. Since US key partners like Saudi Arabia just witnessed that partnership does not imply protection in case of a US-led disorder, especially European NATO allies should have answers ready how they aim to engage with the region. And more generally, alliance dynamics would clearly benefit from a joint (albeit not necessarily shared) assessment — or at least an honest conversation — on the transatlantic fallouts over Iran, and how allies can better anticipate and potentially avoid such tensions in the future.

Challenge 3: new alliance dynamics of power politics and weaponised interdependence

The third challenge for alliance reform at the Ankara summit is a broader shift in the way of conducting alliance politics under the Trump administration, and Europe’s way to respond to it.

Tensions are nothing new to NATO, but the scope of open transatlantic fallouts since early 2025 are unprecedented — especially because they now also include openly displayed hostility of the US against the EU or threats against territory of EU member states. While these tensions used to play out on the political level and would eventually morph into alliance fragmentation on the military level, as it was the case with the US intervention in Iraq, these tensions can now turn into direct pressure of the US against allies. Although the US and Europe both regularly emphasise the importance of allies, it is clearly visible that old alliance dynamics are over, and that Europe has to end the senior partner myth of the US as a benevolent partner.

The question NATO allies more generally need to answer (collectively and individually) is the one of alliance cohesion and guardrails in case of fallouts. The buzzword of the hour in international politics, weaponised interdependence, is also increasingly observed in the transatlantic relationship, for example in US tariffs against Europe or in the withdrawal of 5,000 US soldiers and the cancelled deployment of long-range missiles to Europe in reaction to a statement by German chancellor Merz on Iran.

Compared to 2025, where European leaders still mostly tried to accommodate US requests and were willing to take the costs or swallow their pride as long as it would maintain a relatively stable relationship with the White House, their approach has clearly changed since the beginning of this year. Especially since the threats from the US to annex Greenland, Europe has started more vocally standing up to Washington and also transforms its resources of power, such as its economic weight and the US bases in Europe, into political leverage and agency in the relationship. Europe’s threats to use the anti-coercion instrument in response to US economic coercion or clear opposition to US action in Iran recently (while still maintaining access to US bases in Europe) show that Europe is increasingly discovering its agency in the relationship, including the identification of potential chokepoints and leverage. As power politics and reaction strategies increasingly characterise alliance politics, Europe and the US would be well advised to define mechanisms for deescalation and strategies to avoid NATO becoming collateral damage of power plays.

What does it take for a successful Ankara summit?

A key marker for success — or, more precisely, the lowest common denominator — seems to be fulfilled: as most European allies have significantly ramped up their defence spending, NATO allies will likely emphasise the partial achievement of this goal and first steps towards burden-shifting. At the minimum, the summit can be expected to produce a short, consensual communiqué highlighting that European allies are taking their responsibilities seriously and that the US is encouraging a stronger role for Europe in NATO. While there is a risk that the summit will not produce anything substantive in terms of policy or vision for the alliance, a communication disaster without an even minimal communiqué can most likely be avoided.

It is more uncertain whether allies will be able to go beyond the show of unity around defence spending and agree on more substantive steps. A successful summit therefore requires a dual-track dynamic: on the one hand, the US needs to be clear on its priorities as recent developments in US foreign policy leave Europeans uncertain about the actual direction of travel and prioritisation in Washington. On the other hand, Europeans should not idly wait for Washington to present and then potentially impose its vision for European security and the alliance. Concretely, they should define non-negotiables and key priorities at the least, and a more comprehensive genuinely European vision for the alliance at best.

While a summit, especially given the silence from Washington on the topic, will most likely not produce a comprehensive plan for alliance reform, a realistic ambition could consist in agreeing on a roadmap for realising NATO 3.0. Beyond mutually agreeing on the idea that Europeans gradually take on most of the conventional burden whereas the US can withdraw and focus on nuclear deterrence and intelligence, the ambition for a successful summit could consist in a roadmap for a political vision of NATO 3.0. Concretely, this could imply a process similar to the Strategic Concept, with working groups on different priority areas. Instead of navigating alliance reform and burden-shifting on sight, the Ankara summit should become the official kick-off for an institutional and political process.