Geopolitical Europe Pulse: towards European nuclear deterrence?
10 April 2025
Discussions on European nuclear deterrence and capabilities have gained traction in recent weeks — but how realistic is nuclear deterrence “made in Europe”? This Geopolitical Europe Pulse brings you a compilation of content on the state of nuclear deterrence in Europe and potential options for Europeans.
Quick refresh: Why has the topic of nuclear deterrence in Europe resurfaced again? The answer lies in the White House. The re-election of Donald Trump and the US President’s ambiguous statements regarding the protection of European allies — along with the questioning of the transatlantic alliance by leading figures in the current US administration — raise concern about the validity of US security guarantees for Europe, including in the areas of nuclear deterrence. Consequently, European states are looking for alternatives.
All eyes on France and the United Kingdom: If the United States is no longer willing to provide a nuclear umbrella for Europe, attention will shift to the ability and willingness of Europe’s very own nuclear powers, France and the UK. This explainer in The Conversation provides a brief overview of the limits and opportunities of French and British nuclear deterrence for Europe and discusses possible scenarios.
A eurodeterrent? Despite the limited capabilities of France and United Kingdom compared to the United States, researchers and experts are reflecting on potential options for a so-called “eurodeterrent”, meaning a nuclear force of the two European nuclear powers. This piece in War on the Rocks argues that a Eurodeterrent “is the best option for Europe” under the current conditions and provides a potential roadmap.
Zoom on France: France holds a special place in the debate on nuclear deterrence “made in Europe” because its nuclear weapons are, in contrast to the United Kingdom, not dependent on the United States. The piece “From Paris with Love” provides an overview over the French nuclear doctrine, possible policy options, and their limits.
Zoom on the UK: A key challenge for the United Kingdom when it comes to its contribution to nuclear deterrence in Europe is its reliance on the United States. Although the British nuclear deterrent, Trident, is operationally independent, it relies on the United States in several ways, for example through leasing systems, cooperating on research and development, and purchasing aeroshells, which are necessary for the production of nuclear warheads. This analysis by Chatham House experts concludes that “continuing to rely on the US for its deterrent seems a risky option. The first Trump administration might have looked like an aberration, but his second term may reflect deeper long-term shifts in US foreign policy. For now, it is expedient for the UK to maintain close relations with the US and work to keep Washington committed to NATO, but exploring options to develop substitute capabilities with European allies may be the next logical move, despite the challenges.”
Long read: “Ideology and the Red Button: How Ideology Shapes Nuclear Weapons’ Use Preferences in Europe” (Onderco, Etienne, & Smetana 2024, published in Foreign Policy Analysis) presents the results of a study on the correlation between party ideology and attitudes toward the use of nuclear weapons.