Geopolitical Europe Pulse: Europe alone?
7 March 2025
The speech of US Vice President J.D. Vance at the Munich Security Conference in mid-February, the start of talks about the future of Ukraine between the United States and Russia, the clash between Trump, Vance, and Zelenskyy in the Oval Office, and the end of US support to Ukraine: although there was no doubt among Europeans that they would need step up their commitments to European security and defending Ukraine, the magnitude and the speed of transatlantic fractions on the topic even surprise most pessimistic observers. This edition of the Geopolitical Europe Pulse brings you a compilation of content regarding the future of the transatlantic relationship and European defence.
Zoom on EU reactions: Earlier this week, the EU Commission announced the ReArm EU programme, which will include 150 bn euros in loans for defence spending for member states and exempts defence spending from the EU deficit rules, which is expected to generate additional 650 bn euros over four years (if all member states increased spending by 1.5%). While the Special European Council, held on 6 March 2025 with a focus on European defence, endorsed this programme in the Council Conclusions, it did not produce other significant breakthroughs — not at least because Hungary blocked strong wording on Ukraine, as visible in the first part of the conclusions.
A European army? With the discussion on the potential deployment of European troops to Ukraine as a part of a ceasefire deal, the discussion on a European army has resurfaced. This piece by Max Bergmann presents the key challenges and potential necessary steps, such as the creation of a common standing force and a common command structure.
European troops in Ukraine: European heads of State and Government emphasise that a potential troop deployment to Ukraine could only be envisaged as part of a ceasefire deal, but reflections on the potential format and mandate of such a force have already started. Drawing on insights from the Live Oak — a joint military planning group consisting of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States in order to prepare potential responses to Soviet Union or Warsaw Pact aggressions —, Rafael Loss explains in this piece how Europeans can learn from history “on command and control, on contingency planning, and on communicating with partners and foe”.
Deepening EU-UK defence cooperation: Defence cooperation between the EU and UK gains traction in a changing transatlantic relationship. As Luigi Scazzieri writes: “The easiest way for the EU and the UK to deepen co-operation is to reap some quick wins. By the date of their May summit, they should conclude a security and defence partnership to formalise their foreign policy dialogue. The partnership should either include or set out a timeline for the UK’s association to the European Defence Agency (EDA) and for its possible participation in EU military operations.” Full policy brief here.
In French: “European must design a post-American Europe”: In this op-ed in Le Monde, I argue that Europeans have pushed the snooze button on security and defence for too long, sleeping comfortably with the thought that the United States would always back up their security. They now have to break the intellectual taboo and think European security and defence not only with less, but also without the United States.
Long read: “Defending NATO without America”: This article by Bence Nemeth provides an analysis of the potential gaps resulting from US abandonment. The author suggests that the “largest European NATO members (United Kingdom (UK), France, Germany) should compensate for the failing US assurance and permanently station at least one division (15,000 troops) each in the Eastern Flank to support the most vulnerable NATO members, the Baltic states”.