Geopolitical Europe Brief: The day after - five implications of Trump's election for Europe

6 November 2024

The outcome of the US elections became clear earlier than many in Europe had anticipated. While the final result is yet to be officially announced, it seems that Donald Trump will be the next President of the United States. Many European leaders have already sent notes of congratulations to the former, and incoming, US President.

This result will have massive implications for Europe, the way European states will address security challenges, and Europe’s role as a geopolitical actor. Five major implications are described below — without the claim to completeness.

(1) Europeans must stop hitting the snooze button

The idea that the result of the elections was a “wake-up call” for Europeans is misleading. The deep trends shifting the United States’ political landscape were already visible in the first election of Donald Trump in 2016, and the election of Joe Biden in 2020, followed by the events on 6 January 2021, did not conceal that Trump’s ideas resonate with a significant share of the US electorate.

Europeans masterfully kept hitting the snooze button over the last years. Especially in Eastern Europe and Germany, a conclusion drawn from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine was that European security needs to be constructed in a transatlantic framework — and did hence not sufficiently reflect on an explicitly European, and potentially Europe-only, solution for the security and defence of the continent. As of today, Europeans are un(der)prepared to address these challenges.

In light of Trump’s comments earlier this year, when he openly questioned his willingness to protect European allies, Europeans now come to realise that relying on the US security guarantee might also be a risky strategic choice. Especially in light of the security challenges Europe is facing, muddling through — or, metaphorically, continue to hit the snooze button and hope for the best — is not going to be an option. Instead, Europeans will have to step up with regard to strategy and capabilities. This implies creating a vision for the future of the European security order, more European capabilities (including capabilities made in Europe), and discussions on deterrence made in Europe.

(2) A Trump presidency can push Europeans together — or tear them apart

In the aftermath of Brexit and the 2016 election, European defence leaped forward, and many new instruments and initiatives were launched during the first Trump presidency — think of the European Defence Fund, the Permanent Structured Cooperation, or the European Peace Facility.

Some argue that the re-election of Donald Trump might constitute a similar push for European security and defence cooperation and could even constitute an opportunity. First signs coming from European capitals, such as consultations of French President Macron and German Chancellor Scholz, which will be followed by a meeting of the respective defence ministers tonight, indicate that the EU’s two biggest member states are taking a step forwards — the 2016 initiatives on European defence cooperation started in a similar way.

However, the state of European security has significantly changed over the last years, and the challenges and threats are much more imminent than they arguably were eight years ago. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has prompted many European states to seek closer bilateral relations and additional security guarantees from the US. This mode of engagement with the US administration could become even more important as Trump has generally been reluctant during his first mandate to engage with the European Union, but instead sought bilateral ties with heads of state and government. If individual European states hedge their bets with Washington and the US administration does not push Europeans to act collectively, fragmentation of Europeans could be the consequence. Furthermore, it has to be seen how political forces in Europe that are ideologically close to Trump and/ or the MAGA Republicans, position themselves — if leaders like Hungary’s Prime Minister Orbán or Italy’s Prime Minister Meloni aimed to seek closer ties with the United States, the transatlantic relationship could look very different in the near future.

(3) Ukraine is the most pressing challenge for Europeans, but their margin of manoeuvre shrinks

Donald Trump has previously announced that he would stop US support for Ukraine, that he would aim to end the conflict within a day, and attempt to do so even before officially taking office in January. But even regardless of the outcome of the elections, reluctance in the US political class to provide further military support to Ukraine has been growing over the last years, as illustrated in the challenging negotiations in Congress over the last US military support package for Ukraine.

For Europeans, Trump’s announcements bring more questions than answer, but it is already safe to say that a scenario of a deal between Trump and Putin, without the representation of European and Ukrainian interests at the table, is the one Europeans fear most. In this case, Europe’s margin of manoeuvre would arguably be shrinking: it is difficult to imagine where Europeans or Ukraine would be openly opposing Trump. European leaders, who face increasing war fatigue among populations at home, could also blame what would largely be perceived as a defeat of Ukraine on Trump.

On the medium to long-term, Europeans have to anticipate shouldering the most significant share of the burden in terms of support for Ukraine. Even if the European support already surpasses US support today, the economic challenges Ukraine faces are massive, let alone reconstruction. As populist forces and forces critical of supporting Ukraine have gained traction in many states over the last months, European heads of state and government will face significant challenges in explaining such support to their citizens.

With the election of Donald Trump, NATO membership for Ukraine seems unrealistic. The only window of opportunity to make progress on this question might be the upcoming last weeks of the Biden administration, but it is questionable to what extent Biden is willing, or would have the political legitimacy in light of Trump’s clear victory, to take such a consequential decision. More realistically, Ukraine’s integration in the European security architecture hinges on the EU member states’ willingness to integrate Ukraine into the EU, which in some states would ultimately require a referendum for approval.

The major problem for Europeans in this context is, however, is the lack of strategy, a common definition of victory or defeat in Ukraine, and ideas for the path forward. For Ukraine, and European security more generally, this is bad news.

(4) Europeans must prepare the scenario of a “dormant NATO”

The scenario of a “dormant NATO” has become increasingly popular in Republican foreign policy circles. While this scenario does not call for a withdrawal of the United States from NATO, Europeans would have to carry the significant share of the military burden, and the United States would remain the defender and deterrer of last resort — under the condition, and only under the condition, that Europeans have done their homework.

If Trump decided to follow this approach, Europeans would have to fundamentally rethink the European contribution to the European security order, and actually revisit the European pillar of NATO. Instead of imagining the alliance as a two-pillared system, NATO would de facto have to become European with a US backstop; to shoulder this massive task, both financially and in terms of capabilities, a good case could be made for the EU playing a central role.

Lastly, Europeans will have to rethink collective defence in Europe. Even as a NATO member, the United States are not automatically bound to defend its European allies in case of an attack on one of them. Article 5, the mutual defence clause, is not automatically “triggered”, as often suggested: rather, NATO member states agree on the type and scope of their support, and can also decide not to provide any support at all. The credibility of the US security guarantee depends on the credibility of the assurances given, both to those protected by the guarantee and those to be deterred. The United States will hence not need to withdraw from NATO to question this mutual support, and could condition it on the Europeans’ financial commitments to the alliance. Especially France and the United Kingdom as states with nuclear weapons will have to play a leading role in discussions on potential alternatives to the US security guarantee.

(5) Europe in US-China competition

A new Trump administration is likely to adopt a tougher approach towards China, and the existing strong economic ties of major European players with Beijing will certainly not be appreciated in the White House. Accordingly, reflections how to navigate Europe’s role in US-China competition will become even more relevant in the next weeks and months.

Several scenarios for European China policy can be imagined at this moment. In case of a new trade war between Washington and Beijing, Europe could itself become the victim of extraterritorial sanctions. The previous EU Commission has already strengthened its geoeconomic toolkit, for example through a more targeted use of sanctions or its economic security initiatives; strengthening the EU’s industrial policy, including through the Green Deal, further contributed to enhancing European sovereignty in the economic realm. While these measures would certainly not shield Europe from ramifications of a US-China trade war, the EU could double down and go further.

Generally speaking, the incoming European Commission can be expected to take a tougher stance on China regarding trade and economic issues, and willingness in Brussels to revisit the approach of China as a partner, competitor and rival, as outlined in the 2019 Strategic Outlook, is growing. While these trends may be well perceived in Washington’s policy bubble, it is unsure whether (or rather: unlikely that) they will suffice to convince the incoming President to design the new administration’s China policy in a way that does not harm European allies’ interests.

Moreover, Europeans could find themselves coerced into alignment with the US on China. As European deterrence and defence depends on the US, it does not need much imagination to think of a scenario where Trump conditions the security guarantee for Europeans on alignment on China. In this case, Europeans would have to choose between vital security interests and economic interests. Such a scenario would effectively undermine calls for Europe to carve out its own niche in US-China competition in order to avoid falling into a logic of geopolitical blocs.