The images from the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Chinese military parade in early September showing leaders of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea together were, for many observers, just another affirmation of these countries moving closer together. Over the past three years, narratives of alignment or even an „alliance“ of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea have gained traction in US strategic debates and are increasingly adopted by European thinkers and politicians. The increasing links between the four powers have been referred to as an „axis of upheaval“ or the „CRINK alliance“: the key argument of those embracing this approach is that an ever-closer alliance between these powers constitutes an authoritarian alliance challenges democracy and the liberal global order. The cooperation between them is seen as part of a global struggle between democracy and autocracy and a broader trend of the emergence of an autocratic global order - and that these powers, all clearly defined as US adversaries, “want nothing less than a new world order”.
In other words, the links between China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are increasingly framed through a lens of Cold War mentality and often too readily follow a binary logic. Cooperation is interpreted as alliance formation and, using the words of realism, a systemic challenge - even if one can reasonably argue that this cooperation is also transactional in many ways. Instead of acknowledging the diversity of the individual powers and their bilateral ties and new formats of cooperation, US thinkers adopt a “one-size-fits-all” approach and intellectually put these four powers into a box, then termed a geopolitical bloc.
This thinking is not helpful for a better European grand strategy and adapting European approaches to trends in global security. In Gen Z terms: the CRINK framing is cringe, and European thinkers and politicians are much better advised to develop their own strategic analysis of these four powers and their relationships among each other. This is particularly relevant as Europe reassesses its approach towards China.
One cannot ignore the web of ties between Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea: they exist and have arguably intensified in several ways in recent years. China and North Korea are treaty allies, and Beijing has concluded a “friendship without limits” with Russia in 2022 and a 25 year-long strategic partnership with Iran. Cooperation between Russia and Iran has perhaps peaked in the support for the Assad regime in the Syrian civil war and remains relevant in many areas today, such as military exercises, defence technology, or connectivity. The participation of North Korean soldiers to Russia’s war effort against Ukraine has direct implications for European security and military cooperation between both partners. An increasing number of meetings of the powers in different constellations also demonstrate increasing exchanges and indicate a willingness to send a political signal.
Nevertheless, seeing China, Russia, Iran and North Korea as an “axis of upheaval” denies the specificities of these powers individually. It is overly simplistic and does neither acknowledge their wildly different power assets - think: military, economic, technological, or as partners to the Global South - in the global order nor the asymmetry of their relationships among each other. China by far surpasses the other three powers in terms of GDP, military spending, foreign direct investment, leadership on key technologies, and connectivity projects, which gives it much more leverage in its respective bilateral relationships with Moscow, Tehran, and Pyongyang. The relationship between Russia and Iran is characterised by “growing ambitions for deeper strategic alignment, yet remains constrained by enduring limitations and competing priorities” and a lack of concrete commitments. And while the images of the SCO summit and the military parade in Beijing clearly demonstrate China’s substantial convening power - as far as the latter is concerned, this also extended Hungary and Slovakia as EU member states -, it is questionable what Beijing actually got out of this meeting in terms of concrete returns to strengthen its position. In fact, there is also a counter-argument to be made that the partnership with Russia, Iran and North Korea is a balancing act for Beijing, as these powers might become a liability undermining China’s ambition to play a global role as a mediator. Especially when it comes to China, Europe would be well advised to take a more differentiated approach than seeing Beijing as a challenge similar to Russia in the Cold War. With a significant degree of economic interdependence and the need to get China on board for addressing challenges of global governance, such as climate or the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals, Europe must get China right. Simply endorsing the narrative of an “axis of upheaval”, which is clearly based on US strategic thinking about US “adversaries”, does not help. Instead, Europe must more thoroughly understand China’s ambitions - a point that is also valid more generally for analysts of international politics, as sharply argued by scholars in a trending piece in International Security.
European strategic thinkers should not just follow the framing of their US peers on grand strategy. Opening the “black box” instead of creating a new box which ignores national specificities does not help but rather risks overlooking specific challenges related to individual characteristics of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. This would make the European conversation on the topic much less cringe - and significantly better.
With "axis of upheaval" a feeble pun on Bushworld's "axis of evil"