Bracing for withdrawal symptoms

The US announced over the weekend to withdraw 5,000 soldiers from Germany. But the consequences of the latest transatlantic fallout range further, including beyond Europe.

After German chancellor Friedrich Merz said in an exchange with students that the US did not have a strategy in Iran and that the entire US as a nation was being “humiliated” by the Iranian leadership, the answer from the White House followed swiftly: US President Trump reacted in several posts on Truth Social, announced the withdrawal of 5,000 US troops from Germany, threatened with new tariffs against the German car industry, and cancelled the planned deployment of US long-range missiles to Europe.

These decisions do first and foremost affect European security, but Europeans will not be the only ones closely following the US’ response to Merz’s statement — not least because the implications are much broader.

Troop withdrawal: not a military game changer but a strong political signal

Europe is, of course, most affected by the announced measures of the US administration. While the withdrawal of 5,000 troops provoked most headlines, it is the least relevant announcement from a material point of view. In total, the US has stationed around 36.000 active-duty personnel in Germany, and around 86,000 all over Europe. The German defence minister called the withdrawal “foreseeable”, and one could indeed expect that a gradual withdrawal of troops from Europe would happen sooner or later. From a military and deterrence perspective, the withdrawal is not significant or, in other words, a game changer. Would the US, in coordination with European partners, have decided to do so, the decision would most likely not even have made it on the front page or in the major headlines of international newspapers. The way the decision was taken and communicated demonstrates, however, again that coordination within the alliance is not a key priority for this US administration, whereas political symbolism is.

Indeed, it is here that the withdrawal symptoms will kick in. Europe realises that even efforts for good relationships and the implementation of alliance commitments do not shield Europe from spontaneous but highly symbolic adjustments of US foreign policy. The withdrawal of soldiers is not a military game changer, but hints to the future of the alliance: it is highly symbolic in the sense that it might pave the way towards further such movements. Europe is realising that this is happening sooner rather than later, and in a less coordinated way than desirable.

European deterrence under pressure

The non-deployment of the long-range missiles and the announcements of tariffs affect other European states directly as well. The deployment of tomahawk missiles and typhoon launch systems was agreed under the Biden administration and intended to strengthen Europe’s deterrence vis-à-vis Russia, as these deep-strike capabilities could reach targets within Russia and hence cause significant damage. Consequently, the cancellation of the deployment deprives Europeans of a key capability to deter Russia; it therefore risks creating or widening a deterrence gap Europe might face with a withdrawal of the US from European security.

The announcement also comes at a time when European allies are increasingly encountering difficulties with deliveries of US systems. As the Iran war is gradually draining US stockpiles, the US had warned European allies, namely Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, and the UK — all particularly dependent on the delivery of these systems — to expect longer delays in the delivery of US weapons. The decisions about such acquisitions are usually based not only on tactical and operational needs but also on strategic questions, and “buying American” was often considered a successful strategy to keep the US engaged in European security and Europe, albeit not on top, still somewhere high on the priority list. It now becomes apparent that this calculus does not work.

These concrete implications for European defence demonstrate that what many European states generally consider the plan A for European security, namely a strong transatlantic alliance, might not work as the only plan. In absence of its own capabilities, European states have an interest in keeping the US involved — but they also need to plan for the cases where US commitments cannot be relied on as the sole solution. In other words, the cancellation of the deployment of long-range weapons also demonstrates again that Europeans need to develop a genuinely European way of deterrence, certainly over the medium-term and increasingly also over the short-term.

Enter EU, or not?

From a more technical (but not less political) perspective, the announcement of new tariffs have direct implications in Brussels because the EU holds exclusive competence over trade, meaning that these matters are addressed by the EU and not individual member states. As the EU and the US had just agreed on a 15% tariff through the EU-US trade deal, it now remains to be seen how the Commission will respond to these one-sided changes to the deal from Washington.

More generally, the key question is to what extent the newest developments leads to unity or fragmentation in Europe. As Europe’s economic heavyweight (and military spending heavyweight, in absolute numbers) is now being targeted by Washington, this could lead other European states to push for a strong response on the EU level through the EU’s trade instruments. On the other hand, the US’ announcements and decisions could also push certain European states to push for accelerating the European sovereignty agenda, including on defence, and more European defence “made in Europe” without the US in light of concerns about US reliability.

The underlying political questions for Europe, on the EU level and NATO-Europe level, remains the same as when the Trump administration pressured Europe over Greenland. To what extent does Europe still see the US as a partner? How does it deal with coercion from Washington? And what tools are at its disposal to develop leverage over Washington? The EU already brings a considerable toolkit, particularly because of its economic power, but whether this power is used to respond to Washington is a political decision — one that member states and EU institutions need to take sooner than later.

The big picture: lessons from US allies, partners, and adversaries

While the immediate military consequences of the decision to withdraw soldiers from Germany and halt the deployment of long-range missiles to Europe primarily affects European security, the implications of these developments go far beyond the European theatre. More generally, the decision reaffirms what has already been taking shape as US foreign policy under the current administration: fallouts or tensions will not be resolved diplomatically, but power politics is the means of choice. Coercion (or threats thereof) and punishment through direct measures rather than solutions behind the scenes are the preferred means for foreign policy. This hegemonic hostility and “power politics first” approach directly affect the margin of manoeuvre for US allies, partners, and adversaries.

US allies and partners around the world are closely watching how decisions are being made in the White House, especially as US foreign policy has become less predictable (or, more precisely, almost unpredictable) over the last one and a half years. German chancellor Merz was generally considered to have built a relatively solid or at least effective working relationship with the US President, even though, or perhaps especially because, Trump has never spared Germany from criticism or threats of coercion during his first administration. The fact that all these efforts of relationship-building can be undermined by a single statement will inspire other US allies and partners to weigh their words when publicly commenting on developments involving the US. Yet, more importantly, it will lead to a profound questioning of the reliability of the US as a partner, even if allies and partners do their homework — and therefore stands in line with the Greenland episode, when Denmark became the target of threats. (On a side note, the tensions over Greenland are most likely not over, but muted for the moment.) Consequently, allies and partners increasingly realise that the partnership with the US, albeit often the only option today, requires an alternative in the future, be it through hedging or increasing one’s autonomy.

US adversaries will also learn a lesson from the recent developments. Once again, it has become obvious that the critical power centre in this administration is the White House; even though different actors obviously try to influence the decision-making process there, it is ultimately Trump and factors like personal judgement or reactions that shape US foreign policy. The fact that a consequential decision for the defence of allies and deterrence in Europe was taken in reaction to a statement from a partner also shows the high potential for fragmentation of US alliances and partnerships, and with it the potential for driving wedges between the US and its allies.

Allies and partners will have to brace for painful withdrawal symptoms. And those actors challenging either the security of allies and partners, or the US more generally, can exploit these symptoms and their root causes.