A dormant NATO is not the worst-case — if Europe shapes it
6 February 2025
Europe should enforce the idea of a dormant NATO and proactively shape it — through moving from idea of a “European pillar” to a “European base” in NATO.
The change in the White House has significant implications for the United States’ allies. Washington’s European allies might be among the first to face the consequences of US foreign policy change, not least because President-elect Trump has announced to end the war in Ukraine within 24 hours. More generally and more structurally, it is very likely that the United States will rethink their engagement in European security. This trajectory is not new: it stands in continuity with Obama’s “pivot to Asia” and the shift of the United States’ strategic priorities to the Indo-Pacific. What previous US Presidents have been telling Europeans consistently in private — namely that Europeans need to do more to defend Europe — might now be catalysed by a President who also publicly conditions the US security guarantee to Europe on a more significant European contribution to European security.
In Republican circles, the idea of a “dormant NATO” might gain traction. This model of US engagement in Europe would strike a balance between two ends of the foreign policy options on engagement through shifting away from the US’ current approach of NATO, deep engagement, to a more passive role of the US in European security, yet without abandoning the security guarantees for Europe. While a formal withdrawal from NATO would imply long processes and require a lot of political bandwidth in the United States, a “dormant NATO” might be the ideal scenario for Washington in the years to come — even beyond a Trump presidency.
Consequently, Europeans should not only be prepared for this scenario but also actively aim to shape the path towards it. Instead of aiming to keep the United States involved in European security at any price, including concessions that might undermine European interests, Europeans would be better advised to proactively reform and Europeanise NATO. Metaphorically speaking, they should move NATO towards a model which abandons the idea of a US and European pillar, where the entire architecture risks collapsing when the US pillar totters or breaks away, to an understanding of NATO with a strong European base and a US backstop. In this case, a “dormant” NATO would not be a worst-case scenario for Europe but even an opportunity.
Shifting away from deep engagement in Europe
The scenario of a dormant NATO would imply a shift in the US’ paradigm regarding its engagement in alliances. NATO constitutes a prime example of US deep engagement, where a strongly institutionalised alliance comes with strong ties across different realms, significant responsibilities of the United States for their allies’ security, and extremely high leverage on the allies’ foreign policy. For the United States, the moment of US hegemony encouraged deep engagement, meaning an extensive network of alliances which are neatly managed by the United States. These alliances allow Washington to keep its grip on allies, shape their foreign policy to its benefit, and gain leverage vis-à-vis adversaries, and albeit sometimes challenging, Washington can afford the cost of alliance management. Traditionally, this approach to alliances, alongside a strong web of alliances forming the institutional backbone for US deep engagement, has allowed the United States to ensure its position of global primacy.
However, it is now likely that the new administration will revise its approach to alliances, including NATO. The deep engagement strategy, including in Europe, came with considerable cost for the United States, both in material terms — such as carrying most of the financial burden for European defence — and political terms through providing a credible security guarantee and being willing to accept the potential military and human cost for the protection of allies. It is for a good reason that some strategic thinkers question whether deep engagement actually pays off in the form of strategic advantages: if deep engagement was a tool for the United States to manage allies and to have them support US foreign policy priorities, it is questionable whether Europeans have been prime examples of doing so — the limited European defence spending to NATO over decades or clear transatlantic divergence on Iraq are just two examples.
Against this background, the scenario of a “dormant” NATO might be a preferred option for Washington: while less costly, it would still ensure a certain US influence in Europeans and maintain the foundations of the alliance. Moreover, it would leave control for European security to those who are most concerned and affected, and who should therefore logically also take most political and military responsibility: Europeans.
Time to face reality and get ahead of the curve
For post-Cold War Europe, deep engagement of the United States in Europe through NATO was a relatively comfortable situation, as the logical consequence of enduring unipolarity was rallying around the US’ flag for addressing future threats. In other words, bandwagoning — siding with the hegemon — was a low-cost strategy with high security benefits for Europeans. While this strategy and the US security guarantee has certainly allowed Europeans to reduce defence spending, the reduction of their capabilities also came with an increase of strategic and military dependence on the United States and its priorities, to a point that European security and defence policy has been described as “an act of American hegemony”.
For Europeans, free-riding on US capabilities in NATO was an effective strategy because Washington allowed them to do so. Even if previous US presidents told their European counterparts in private that Europeans need to enhance their security and defence efforts, and even if the trajectory of European security structurally hinged on the decision of voters in US swing states, Europeans continued free-riding — although this was arguably not in Europe’s long-term interest. With the changing European security environment and an administration in the White House with a new foreign policy trajectory, Europeans should now face reality: it is not in the European interest to completely depend on the goodwill of Washington and face the risk of Washington imposing US strategic priorities on Europeans. As the Trump administration will most likely direct political attention away from Europe, Europeans now have a chance to get it right — and craft a European security order that puts European interests first.
From a European perspective, there is a good case to be made for more selective US engagement in Europe. Consequently, Europeans should actively reflect on the US contribution to European security that is both realistically needed and desirable, and seize the moment of a changing US trajectory to present a plan to Washington how a scenario of a “dormant” NATO could become a win for both sides — instead of having Washington impose its vision and not giving Europeans time to prepare. In other words, Europeans must get ahead of the curve with strategic planning for a European security order where they are the key actors, and the US provides a backstop.
Vital interests today versus vital interests in the long-term
Most importantly, a European plan for a “dormant” NATO requires a shift in mindset among Europeans. Russia’s war against Ukraine and the threat it constitutes to Europe have, for a good reason, the highest priority for Europeans at the moment; this is the main reason why the US security guarantee is absolutely crucial for them, and why it is important to obtain a credible commitment from the US administration regarding the viability of article 5 for the United States. Nevertheless, Europeans must not lose sight of their vital interests on the long-term, both with regard to security and prosperity — and this is why selling out autonomous decisions to the United States through creating new strategic dependencies with Washington would be problematic. Most importantly, Europeans should carefully ponder to what extent they want to make China policy a bargaining chip with Washington on the short-term. At a moment where the EU’s approach to China needs an update and where Washington’s approach to China remains unclear, blindly aligning with Washington on China would imply that Europeans deprive themselves of the opportunity to craft a European approach and to define genuinely European interests. On the long-term, such decisions, if taken by national capitals or collectively, could force Europeans to adopt positions that will neither enhance their security nor prosperity.
As the vital interest of Europeans on the short-term is keeping the US engaged in European security, including with the US security guarantee, Europeans must make commitments to the United States to show that they are serious about their own defence. The new US administration will want to see Europeans deliver. Concretely, European governments must clearly communicate to their public that European defence funding, considering the US strategic trajectory, might rather move to three percent than remain at two percent. Furthermore, they should make concrete suggestions how Europeans aim to secure a potential peace deal in Ukraine — including with suggestions for boots-on-the-ground missions, either through a UN-mandated EU mission or a European coalition of the willing. Most importantly, they must leave the post-Cold War mindset, where the United States have a genuine interest in deep engagement in Europe, behind them. As transatlantic relations will become more transactional, Europeans must compile a serious European offer and concrete strategy how they will provide security in Europe, and why serving as a backstop ultimately serves the United States.
Time for a European base of NATO
Together with Russia’s war against Ukraine, the second election of Donald Trump might indeed have been the second structural shock Europeans needed to finally take steps towards more autonomous European action on security and defence. Europeans now need to understand the scenario of a “dormant” NATO does not have to be a nightmare but can be an opportunity to shape security in Europe themselves. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States have largely been a status quo power in Europe and barely adapted their understanding of deterrence and defence in Europe, and so have Europeans in following their strategic lead. Europeans can now break out of this dynamic that is neither healthy for Europe nor for the United States.
A generational shift on both sides of the Atlantic can benefit such European initiatives. A younger generation of strategic thinkers and policymakers in the United States wants to see more European, including EU, engagement on security and defence on the continent, including in Democrat foreign policy circles. Similarly, young European thinkers, whose strategic thinking and vision of the United States has been marked by US foreign policy failures in the Middle East, Afghanistan, and the first Trump era more generally, openly challenge the paradigm that depending on the United States is a good strategy for Europe and argue for more emancipation. Accordingly, now is a good moment for Europeans to actively shape the scenario of a “dormant” NATO. Such a concrete plan should include, for example, a detailed plan for transitioning the lion share of conventional defence and deterrence to Europeans, transferring the post of the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe (SACEUR) to a European, installing a European nuclear dialogue, and concretely articulating how the European nuclear powers could contribute to deterrence while the US assures a backstop.
A first step in doing so is to reframe the understanding of NATO: the alliance is regularly referred to as consisting of a European and a US pillar. Based on this understanding, the entire construction risks to collapse if the US pillar totters or is deliberately weakened; this is a risk Europeans cannot afford. Accordingly, they should fundamentally rethink the structure of deterrence and defence in the alliance, which should rather consist of a strong and solid European base and a US backstop. The European Union, thanks to its significant financial and standard-setting power, can play an integral role in this new European security architecture. The implementation of the EU Defence Industrial Strategy already needs to be a part of this: as the European base of NATO is de facto an alliance among the European NATO members, the EU could serve as a place for EU members to coordinate their efforts politically, financially, and industrially, and allow the non-EU member states to contribute to these efforts through plug-and-play mechanisms. Furthermore, efforts to finance Europe’s capability needs, for example through potential eurobonds, and the EU’s capabilities to address hybrid threats are a significant opportunity NATO’s European base should not miss out on. With EU Commission President von der Leyen, Foreign Affairs Chief Kallas, and defence commissioner Kubilius, the EU’s leadership is likely to prioritise questions of security and defence; for NATO’s European base, seeking close synergies and avoiding duplication of the EU’s assets should therefore be a strategic imperative, and NATO’s Secretary General Rutte should be well positioned to recognise this.
The most important factor for a European base in NATO, however, is timing. Europeans will certainly not be able to produce a fully-fledged plan for how they intend to shape the scenario of a “dormant” NATO, but when the new US administration takes office in mid-January, it will be critical to be able to sketch out at least the general ideas — unless they want a Trump administration to impose the US strategy on European states.